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Litigation and Organization
Educational Rights in a Deliberative Democracy.  
A Book Review of Realizing Educational Rights
By Anne Newman 
  
Reviewed by Todd A. DeMitchell and Winston C. Thompson
The American people have always regarded education and 
the acquisition of knowledge as matters of extreme 
importance. We have recognized the public schools as a most 
vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic 
system of government and as the primary vehicle for 
transmitting the values on which our society rests
— Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)
I have a right. From where does this right 
flow, how is it enforced and by whom, how do you know 
when the right has been violated, what is the remedy 
when it has been violated, and who shall effectuate that remedy? 
How and why do people or groups invoke the language of rights in 
public matters? These are but a few of the questions that come to 
mind when an individual asserts a right.
It is a thorny path to follow when identifying and asserting 
rights. Newman, in her 2013 University of Chicago Press book, 
Realizing Educational Rights: Advancing School Reform through 
Courts and Communities, picks her way carefully along this path, 
studying and elucidating the obstacles, while remaining focused on 
her destination: educational rights. We followed Newman on this 
path and found our journey with her to be provocative and 
enlightening.1
Stated succinctly, Newman (2013) asserts, “The right to 
education is a necessary precondition to fair deliberative democ-
racy” (p. 106). She builds her argument “for a right to education as a 
matter of political equality” (p. 2) and proposes that “deliberative 
democracy cannot be sustained without a robust right to educa-
tion” (p. 3). In ways illustrative of the conceptual complexity of the 
language and logic of rights, her treatment of educational rights is 
procedural in both personal and political dimensions. The right to 
education endorses equality among all participants while also 
suggesting the very preconditions necessary for that participation.
1 The Education Law Association selected Newman’s book to receive the 
Steven S. Goldberg Award for Distinguished Scholarship in Education 
Law.
Newman’s (2013) book proceeds in two parts. The 
first explores political philosophy and historical events to 
describe the conceptual shape of assertions of the right to 
education. In the second, through two case studies, she 
applies dual lenses to empirical findings. She first adopts 
a legal lens to the right to education by analyzing the 
Kentucky case Rose v. Council for Better Education 
(1989) as an example of how school finance litigation in 
a state court is used to assert a right to education. She 
then concludes with a second lens, highlighting efforts 
of advocacy conducted by community organizations 
toward a realized right to education.
Part One: Educational Rights in Theory
Deliberative democracy is built upon a foundation of citizens in 
possession of the ability to deliberate in meaningful ways. In the first 
half of her book, Newman (2013) posits that deliberative democracy 
must protect the right to education as a sustaining ideal. Of course, 
one might imagine that a deliberative body, through democratic 
processes, could curtail a number of the resources available to 
disadvantaged citizens. While acknowledging that this exercise of 
majoritarian politics is certainly possible, deliberative democracies 
must provide sufficient safeguards to prevent this from happening 
in relation to certain lynchpin institutions, education being chief 
among them. Newman observes the precariousness of this protec-
tion, writing: “but as I emphasize . . . , democratic bodies are at best 
unreliable guardians of the rights of all students, and at worst they 
are the source of grave injustices” (p. 51).
Her preference for equality of access to the political process 
through recognition of a right to education is evident in her analysis 
of political theorists such as Gutmann and Thompson. Newman 
notes, positively, that both authors give attention to the educational 
implications of their engagement with deliberative theory.
Following Gutmann, Newman (2013) asserts that educational 
entitlements are hugely vulnerable when structured in absolute 
deference to the processes of democratic deliberation. Allowing 
deliberative bodies the “discretion to decide what constitutes an 
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adequate education . . . provides little protection for the interests of 
educationally disadvantaged citizens” (p. 15). Therefore, Newman 
limits democratic authority so as to preserve the essence of 
deliberative democracy itself. She asserts that “rights claims 
constrain what democratic bodies may decide” (p. 114). Specifically, 
the right to education protects an individual’s entitlement to an 
education from the vicissitudes of (likely, educationally advan-
taged) democratic majorities.
If education is an issue of right, institutional mechanisms must 
exist to support that right in the face of challenges. As government 
is often called to act “to protect our interests or rights from interfer-
ence from others” (Sullivan, 2005, p. 2), Newman (2013) endorses a 
recognized U.S. Constitutionally protected right to education. This 
opportunity to protect the right to education was presented to the 
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez (1973) but, to Newman’s disappointment, the Court 
declined to find that education was a fundamental right deserving 
of the highest level of judicial scrutiny. “The Court was not con-
vinced that education is the most important social good for 
realizing citizen’s political liberties” (p. 55).
Newman’s (2013) argument for the importance of a “satisfac-
tory minimal education” (p. 55) for all citizens is strong. Citizens 
who lack education are likely to be marginalized in and through the 
political process. “Education is intimately connected to individu-
al’s ability to participate in collective decision making as civic  
equals” (p. 86).
In line with this, Newman (2013) finds that a right to educa-
tion requires cognitive autonomy as a buffer against political 
manipulation. “Citizens who are cognitively autonomous have the 
analytical skills to evaluate the veracity of political rhetoric” (p. 36), 
and “An education requires critical openness to new evidence and 
ideas” (p. 38).
Her requirement for intellectual flexibility is reminiscent of 
the Supreme Court in the classic student armband case, Tinker v. 
Des Moines Community School District, (1969), and she writes, “In 
our system, students may not be regarded as closed- circuit 
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. 
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments 
that are officially approved.” (Newman, 2013, p. 506). That is to say, 
an education for a sufficient degree of autonomy frees individuals 
to critique the democratic proposal being presented— a point 
worthy of consideration alongside the concern of the Supreme 
Court in Tinker, in which education just reflects the governmen-
tal position.
Part Two: Educational Rights in Practice
Newman (2013) explores the themes of the second half of her text in 
two sections: (a) the equity and adequacy legal argument of the 
Rose v. Council for Better Education (1989) case involving the public 
school finance scheme of Kentucky and (b) the San Francisco 
community organization Coleman Advocates for Children and 
Youth. Rose casts an adequate education as a legal right enforceable 
by the power of the courts through review of the public funding 
scheme that supports the education of the State’s youth. The 
Coleman Advocates for Children and Youth case study reviews 
education as an aspirational right, using hortatory rather than legal 
power to recognize and enforce the right.
The discussion of the Rose (1989) case is an intriguing choice. 
While lamenting the San Antonio Independent School District 
(1973) decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Newman (2013) turns 
to the state courts to find a legal right to an education. Rose signals 
a fundamental shift in the requirement for how a state supports a 
public education for all of its citizens. Starting with the California 
Supreme Court case Serrano v. Priest (1971), courts judged whether 
a state meets its educational constitutional obligation to its youth 
by ascertaining whether the funding scheme is equal across salient 
differences. Rose set a new course by asking whether the Kentucky 
funding mechanism for public education was adequate to meet the 
requirements of its constitution. Public funding distributed 
throughout Kentucky may be equally distributed, but it may also 
be inadequate in providing the level of education needed to meet 
constitutional standards for an educated citizenry, the court 
reasoned. Newman argues that court decisions, like Rose, that 
focus on the adequacy of the education its youth receive, are “a 
necessary precondition for a just deliberative democracy. 
Education is intimately connected to individuals’ ability to 
participate in collective decision making as civic equals” (p. 86). 
What the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to deliver, the state courts 
provide by defining the education necessary for all citizens, 
thereby affirming the importance of education to the political 
health of the community.
Newman (2013) steers her second case study of advocacy for 
educational rights through community- based democratic politics. 
She places two arrows in the quiver of her argument for education 
as a right for all citizens. The first, as discussed above, is the legal 
arrow. Her second arrow is the persuasiveness in the political arena. 
Thus, she advances two separate lines of arguments for realizing a 
right to education.
Absent a legal anchor for the foundation of a right to educa-
tion, Newman (2013) stresses that the right to education, while 
aspirational, is rooted in deservingness. Because of our humanity, 
education is a right “just by virtue of being people” (p. 94). Equal 
opportunity to receive resources and access, through education, to 
full participation in society is a prioritized entitlement that trumps 
the popular will when it seeks to diminish the individual entitle-
ment. Aspiration confronts majoritarian principles on the concep-
tual level; thus, the imprimatur of the law may act as a collaborative 
argument for the aspirational assertion of a right to an education.
Newman (2013) continues the conversation about the place, 
force, and right of education. She clearly identifies the dynamic 
tension between the role of an autonomously educated citizen, 
which both supports deliberative democracy but also provides the 
counterbalance to the potential excesses of majoritarian rule. In 
this, her argument is especially well structured.
Newman (2013) has engaged legal scholars, political theorists, 
and educational philosophers in a meaningful and thoughtful man-
ner about the intersection of the educational autonomy of the 
individual and the majoritarian principles of deliberative democ-
racy. This is the tension she seeks to define and to resolve. 
Democracy is dependent upon an educated citizenry, but what are 
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the boundaries of the democratic processes influence on that 
education? Toward an answer, Newman cuts a supremely useful 
and navigable path.
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